国际关系中的遵约与声誉

编辑:知识号互动百科 时间:2017-04-24 05:55:41
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《国际关系中的遵约与声誉》将国家对国际规则的承诺与遵约纳入一个两阶段框架之中。
中文名
国际关系中的遵约与声誉
外文名
Compliance and reputation in international relations
趋    势
法律化、制度化的趋势
模    式
基于规则的全球治理模式
对    象
国家对国际规则

国际关系中的遵约与声誉中文摘要

编辑
当代国际事务呈现了越来越明显的法律化、制度化的趋势,形成了基于规则的全球治理模式。国家是否遵守国际规则、为何遵守,就成为重要的理论问题和实践问题。解释这些问题,对理解国际制度的有效性也有一定的意义。
  本文将国家对国际规则的承诺与遵约纳入一个两阶段框架之中。承诺是对事后行为的声明,而遵约是对事前承诺的落实。遵约也就是国家对自我承诺的遵守。本文认为,声誉机制是有利于国家遵约的重要因素。违约会对声誉造成负面影响,使本国在他国心目中成为不可信的合约对象,这损害了违约国在未来的可信承诺能力。国家为了在未来收获更多的合作收益,不得不克服短期的...>> 详细[1] 
当代国际事务呈现了越来越明显的法律化、制度化的趋势,形成了基于规则的全球治理模式。国家是否遵守国际规则、为何遵守,就成为重要的理论问题和实践问题。解释这些问题,对理解国际制度的有效性也有一定的意义。
  本文将国家对国际规则的承诺与遵约纳入一个两阶段框架之中。承诺是对事后行为的声明,而遵约是对事前承诺的落实。遵约也就是国家对自我承诺的遵守。本文认为,声誉机制是有利于国家遵约的重要因素。违约会对声誉造成负面影响,使本国在他国心目中成为不可信的合约对象,这损害了违约国在未来的可信承诺能力。国家为了在未来收获更多的合作收益,不得不克服短期的违约动机以维系良好的声誉。因此声誉是促使国家遵约的重要机制。
  声誉机制不仅在国家间层面起作用,也可能通过国内听众成本而发挥影响。民主遵约论认为,民主国家的公众更有可能通过选举杠杆惩罚做出违约决策的政治家,因此民主国家的国际承诺更可信、遵约记录更好。本文对这种观点进行了检验,认为它忽略了一条重要的边界条件,即公众的政策偏好是倾向于遵约的。这一条件未必能够成立,需要结合具体问题,考察遵约对国内不同群体造成的分配性后果,以判断公众的政策偏好。
  为了克服所谓的遵约内生性问题、表明承诺本身对国家行为的制约效应,本文以主权债务为例对国家遵约的原因进行了考察。在主权债务问题上,遵约就表现为偿债。通过经验研究,本文发现,违约国会被国际资本市场驱逐,在重返资本市场时不得不支付更高的利率,声誉存疑的国家通过自我设限、以使潜在的债权人相信偿债承诺的可信性,债权人之间形成了集体行动安排、以使声誉机制能够发挥作用。这些经验现象符合声誉理论的预测,表明声誉机制有利于促进遵约。
  在偿债问题上,公众不一定会支持遵约。发展中国家的国内储蓄低、债务结构主要是外债。在经济危机较为严重、债务问题成为选民关注的焦点时,偿债意味着增税和削减福利开支,这对广泛的国内选民造成了不利的分配性后果。当选民运用选举杠杆对决策者施加影响时,他们更有可能惩罚主张偿债的政治家。因此,发展中的民主国家更有可能对主权债务违约。阿根廷选民在1999年和2001年两次选举中的投票倾向,以及秘鲁和智利在80年代债务危机中对财政稳定方案的履行情况,这两组比较案例支持了本文的观点。这一发现表明了在考察国内制度与遵约表现之间的因果关系时,应结合具体问题上遵约/违约对国内公众的分配性后果,离开边界条件的民主遵约论不能成立。
  [关键词]国际制度 遵约 承诺 声誉 政体类型

国际关系中的遵约与声誉外文摘要

编辑
Legalization and institutionalization have been showing potent sways on contemporary international relations, and rule-based global governance system comes into being in a multitude of world affairs. Whether or not states complied with these rules? Why, if they comply? Inasmuch that these questions seem to be significant in theoretical and practical meaning, relevant enquiry may contribute to understanding the effectiveness or performance of international institutions.
  This dissertation ...>> 详细
Legalization and institutionalization have been showing potent sways on contemporary international relations, and rule-based global governance system comes into being in a multitude of world affairs. Whether or not states complied with these rules? Why, if they comply? Inasmuch that these questions seem to be significant in theoretical and practical meaning, relevant enquiry may contribute to understanding the effectiveness or performance of international institutions.
  This dissertation integrates state''s commitment to and compliance with international rules into a two-stage framework: commitment exists as a statement on ex post behavior, while compliance emerges as fulfillment on ex ante commitment. I will argue that reputation is an important mechanism to incline states toward deference. Violations will invite a bad reputation qua an unfaithful contract-partner and hurt violator''s future ability to credible commitment. Consequently, states have to make trade-off between short-term gains from defect and long-term gains from good compliance-record, for the sake of maintaining an acceptable reputation. In this way, reputation mechanism enhances states'' compliance willingness.
  While operates on inter-state level, however, reputation mechanism may also works on intra-state panel via so-called "domestic audience cost." Some researchers espouse "theory of democratic compliance," which maintains democracies have better capabilities in making credible commitments and keeping good compliance records, by the reason that decision-makers in these countries, vis-a-vis their counterparts in authoritarian states, face higher "domestic audience cost." Such hypothesis, this dissertation argues, overlooks a pivotal boundary condition, that is, electorate tends to support state''s compliance with international rules. Such an assumption, however, not necessarily holds. Accordingly, it is imperative that researchers investigate voters'' policy preferences in a given substantive issue, in the light of domestic distributive consequences of compliance decision.
  In order to control so-called "endogeneity problem" and identify constraining effect on state behavior of commitment per se, this dissertation selects sovereign debt as cases. Compliance means repayment service as contracted. In real-world sovereign debt practices, I find four frequent behavioral patterns: 1) sovereign defaulters are excluded from international capital market; 2) when re-accessing to market, defaulters have to make offers with higher interest rate; 3) states with uncertain or tainted reputation resort to self-binding contractual terms so as to persuade potential lenders; 4) creditors establish collective action arrangements to activate reputation mechanism. All of these empirical findings appear consistent with theoretical predictions of reputation hypothesis, and suggest reputation mechanism significantly contributes to state''s faithful repayment or compliance.
  More often than not, electorate doesn''t support faithful debt repayment. Due to their low saving rates in developing countries, external debt accounts for the lion share of government debts. When macro-economic fundamental goes from bad to worse and hence when debt-service issue becomes salient, repayment entails, inter alia, increasing tax and/or cutting social welfare expenditure, which strikes a blow against the broad social strata. Empowered with ballots to decide politician''s political survival, the median voter will punish the decision-maker who advocates debt-service. For this reason, developing democracies tend to more default on their sovereign debts than authoritarian states. Two comparative cases support this finding. The first involves the systemic changes of Argentine voters'' behavior from 1999 to 2001. The second compares the notably distinctive compliance-records on financial stability packages between nascent democratic Peru and military dictatorship in Chile. This finding suggests that, while investigating causal impact of regime type on compliance-record, researchers should take into account domestic distributive consequences of international rules. "Theory of democratic compliance," as a universal judgment, should not be applied without certain boundary conditions.
  [Key Words] international institutions, compliance, commitment, reputation, regime type
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